Besides being a collection of Purdy magazine articles the book also contains a biography and a collection of Purdy’ games. The games themselves aren’t of the high standard you would find in world championship caliber play, but they show how he applied his principles in his games, mistakes and all.
According to Chessmetrics, Purdy’s highest ever assigned rating is a “mere” 2346 which ranked him way down at number 804 in the world. Purdy’s 139 over-the-board tournaments, 43 telegraphic matches and 14 other matches were mostly against players in his part of the world which is a long way from Europe. But, in telegraphic matches he had draws against Golombek and Tartakower. And, in the first World Correspondence Championship he scored wins over such notable correspondence players as John W. Collins, Olaf Barda, Gabriel Wood and Mario Napolitano.
One of the Purdy games in the book has some insights on the link between strategy and tactics buried in the annotations. That was his game against Bela Berger that was played in the 1964 New South Wales Championship.
Bela Berger (August, 1931 - December 2005) was a Hungarian-Australian master. After the failure of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, Berger emigrated from to Australia. He won the New South Wales state title in 1957 and 1961 and second second in the 1959 Australian Championship behind Lajos Steiner.
Berger was one of Australia's representatives at the 1963 Pacific Zone 10 Championship in Jakarta. National champion John Purdy was chosen first, and a quadrangular tournament was held for the second spot. Berger and Karlis Ozols tied for first; then the selectors voted in favour of Berger 3-0. The Jakarta result was Berger's best of his career. He tied for first on 5.5/8, and then won the playoff against Indonesia's Arovah Bachtiar. (He won the playoff 2-1 after 3 games; a fourth game was won by Bachtiar, but it had no bearing on the outcome, as the tiebreak system used favored Berger). The win gave him the title of International Master, and qualified him for the Interzonal of the 1964-66 World Championship cycle. At the Interzonal he finished 23rd out of 24.
The following game is especially instructive because it demonstrates the link between strategy and tactics. In a nutshell, Purdy explained strategy as “choosing aims,” meaning an attempt at reaching a particular type of position. Purdy was always quick to point out that strategy is a reliable course of action to be undertaken only after tactics can be ruled out.
A Purdyism: All good players must be good tactically. All masters must be good both tactically and strategically. Someone who is good strategically and not tactically may understand the play of masters up to a point, but cannot possibly play well himself.
Purdy’s comments on the following game are representative of the type of instruction his annotations contained. When Berger played 6.O-O it was criticized by Purdy because while it gives white the option of building up the center with either d4 or playing the quieter Steinitz setup of d3, the move d4 is the only way white can hope to gain an advantage against black’s setup in this game, the Steinitz Defense Deferred.
At move 10 Purdy observed that the Ruy Lopez is worthless to white unless played with great precision, but if it is, it it perhaps the best of all openings.
He noted at move 13 that in practical play the question of how big or how small a theoretical advantage one side has is not important. If one side’s moves are easy and the other’s hard, that’s important. To have an easy game means to have a clearly good aim or strategy and no difficult tactical problem to solve in achieving it.
Black’s 20th move illustrates an interesting clash between strategy and tactics. A plan is only something to follow if nothing better turns up. Positionally it would have been better to have a N or R on f4 than a P, but because of the tactical point that the threat of ...fxe3 forces the N to move, black had the opportunity to break up white’s castled position and that was better than the mere superiority of piece placement.
Regarding 21...f3 he pointed out that to a master the reply 22.g3 would not work because however obscure, the knockout must be there. When Purdy played 25...Re6 it represented an important strategical decision. Should black try and attack the King which would be very speculative? White’s K was exposed and was going to stay that way, but on the other hand, there was only one open file. In order to guarantee the win, black must get control of it.
Both sides were walking a fine line, but Purdy’s position always seemed just a bit better and in the end he managed to squeeze out a win in this instructive game.
[Event "New South Wales Championship"]
[Site "?"]
[Date "1964.??.??"]
[Round "?"]
[White "Bela Berger"]
[Black "C.J.S. Purdy"]
[Result "0-1"]
[PlyCount "37"]
[EventDate "1964.??.??"]
{Ruy Lopez} 1. e4 e5 2. Nf3 Nc6 3. Bb5 a6 4. Ba4 d6 5. c3 Bd7 6. O-O Nge7 {
According to
Purdy, after this the only good move for white is 7.d4. Berger is playing the
Steinitz attack against the Steinitz defense, but it is a poor choice as long
as black has the move ...f5 available.} 7. d3 Ng6 8. Re1 Be7 9. Nbd2 O-O {
} 10. Nf1 f5 {If white plays 11.Ne3 exf4 12. dxe4 Kh8 Purdy says black should have
good play. I assume he means black has equailzed. And, as often happens,
winning the b-Pawn with 11.Qb3+ is not a good idea. Purdy left it to his
readers to figure out why. I will do the same.} 11. exf5 Bxf5 12. Ne3 {Bd7
Nd5 Now it may look like pinning the N with 13...Bg4 is plausible, but
it's quite bad. After 14. Qb3! Kh8 (if 14...Bxf3 then 15.Nxe7+ and Nxg6+ and
17.gxf3 wins a piece.) 15.Qxb7 Bxf 16.gxf3 white's K-side is wrecked but white
wins a couple of Ps and black's pieces are too disorganized to launch any kind
of K-side attack.} Kh8 {Nxe7 Ncxe7} 13. Ng5 {Good. Berger wants to
place his N on e4 and at the same time this threatens the attacking Qh5.
Bxa4 Sacrificing a piece with16.Qh6 is met by 16...h6 and there is no
way to continue the attack. Qxa4 At this point the position is quite
even, but within a couple of moves Berger's position is critical. So where
does he go wrong?!} Qc8 {Be3 h6} 14. Ne4 {Nd5 Purdy obviously wants
to put a N on f5 and white cannot prevent this with g3. Here is where things
turn sour for white. Bad is 19.g3 Ndf4! (anyway) 20.gxf4 Qg4+ followed by
... exf4 and ...f3. It seems that his best move was 19.Qd1 as withdrawing the
Q to help defend his K-side. Ng3 Ndf4 Bxf4 He still should have
tried 20.Qd1. exf4 Nf1 f3 Can white defend with 22.g3? If he does
then if 22... Qh6 23.Ne3 and it's hard to see how black can continue his
attack. However, after 22.g3 Nf4! then 23...Nxd3 wins a P and white is still
badly tied up so black must eventually win. Qe4 fxg2 This allows
exchanges to a drawish position. Black could have kept up the pressure with
22...Rf6 and ...Nf5, but Purdy was relying on another trump ...he will gain
control of the e-file. Qxg6 gxf1=Q+ Rxf1 The material is equal and
with just heavy piece on the board it's hard to imagine that black can win.
} Rf6 {Qe4 Re6 Purdy pursues his strategy of controlling the e-file.
If the white Q stays on the long diagonal, black will offer a P or two as
bait. For example, now if 26.Qf3 Qe8! and white dare not play 27.Qxb7 because
after 27...Rb8 black invades on the second rank with decisive results.
} 15. Qg4 Qe8 16. Kh1 {Qc6+ f3 Rae8 Rf2 Qd5 d4 R8e7 Purdy was suffering
from time pressure here and was playing fast but reckoned he was winning and
all he had to do was hold out until the time control was reached. b3} b5 {/>} 17. Rg1 {Re3 Qf4} Qf7 {Qxf7 Rxf7 Rc1 Rfxf3 Rxf3 Rxf3} 18. c4 b4 {/> It's hard to calculate, but better was 38.Re1 Rf2 39. Re7. At least white has
an active R. However, careful calculation shows that black can, with correct
play, win the R and P ending.} 19. c5 { A few more moves were played until adjournment. Black has an easy win because he picks up a second P and white has no counterplay. 0-1} 0-1
Purdy, after this the only good move for white is 7.d4. Berger is playing the
Steinitz attack against the Steinitz defense, but it is a poor choice as long
as black has the move ...f5 available.} 7. d3 Ng6 8. Re1 Be7 9. Nbd2 O-O {
} 10. Nf1 f5 {If white plays 11.Ne3 exf4 12. dxe4 Kh8 Purdy says black should have
good play. I assume he means black has equailzed. And, as often happens,
winning the b-Pawn with 11.Qb3+ is not a good idea. Purdy left it to his
readers to figure out why. I will do the same.} 11. exf5 Bxf5 12. Ne3 {Bd7
Nd5 Now it may look like pinning the N with 13...Bg4 is plausible, but
it's quite bad. After 14. Qb3! Kh8 (if 14...Bxf3 then 15.Nxe7+ and Nxg6+ and
17.gxf3 wins a piece.) 15.Qxb7 Bxf 16.gxf3 white's K-side is wrecked but white
wins a couple of Ps and black's pieces are too disorganized to launch any kind
of K-side attack.} Kh8 {Nxe7 Ncxe7} 13. Ng5 {Good. Berger wants to
place his N on e4 and at the same time this threatens the attacking Qh5.
Bxa4 Sacrificing a piece with16.Qh6 is met by 16...h6 and there is no
way to continue the attack. Qxa4 At this point the position is quite
even, but within a couple of moves Berger's position is critical. So where
does he go wrong?!} Qc8 {Be3 h6} 14. Ne4 {Nd5 Purdy obviously wants
to put a N on f5 and white cannot prevent this with g3. Here is where things
turn sour for white. Bad is 19.g3 Ndf4! (anyway) 20.gxf4 Qg4+ followed by
... exf4 and ...f3. It seems that his best move was 19.Qd1 as withdrawing the
Q to help defend his K-side. Ng3 Ndf4 Bxf4 He still should have
tried 20.Qd1. exf4 Nf1 f3 Can white defend with 22.g3? If he does
then if 22... Qh6 23.Ne3 and it's hard to see how black can continue his
attack. However, after 22.g3 Nf4! then 23...Nxd3 wins a P and white is still
badly tied up so black must eventually win. Qe4 fxg2 This allows
exchanges to a drawish position. Black could have kept up the pressure with
22...Rf6 and ...Nf5, but Purdy was relying on another trump ...he will gain
control of the e-file. Qxg6 gxf1=Q+ Rxf1 The material is equal and
with just heavy piece on the board it's hard to imagine that black can win.
} Rf6 {Qe4 Re6 Purdy pursues his strategy of controlling the e-file.
If the white Q stays on the long diagonal, black will offer a P or two as
bait. For example, now if 26.Qf3 Qe8! and white dare not play 27.Qxb7 because
after 27...Rb8 black invades on the second rank with decisive results.
} 15. Qg4 Qe8 16. Kh1 {Qc6+ f3 Rae8 Rf2 Qd5 d4 R8e7 Purdy was suffering
from time pressure here and was playing fast but reckoned he was winning and
all he had to do was hold out until the time control was reached. b3} b5 {/>} 17. Rg1 {Re3 Qf4} Qf7 {Qxf7 Rxf7 Rc1 Rfxf3 Rxf3 Rxf3} 18. c4 b4 {/> It's hard to calculate, but better was 38.Re1 Rf2 39. Re7. At least white has
an active R. However, careful calculation shows that black can, with correct
play, win the R and P ending.} 19. c5 { A few more moves were played until adjournment. Black has an easy win because he picks up a second P and white has no counterplay. 0-1} 0-1
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