Backward Pawns and holes are bad except when they’re not. What about when black plays ...e5 in the Sicilian leaving his d-Pawn backward and a hole on d5? The idea is that black wants to:
1) obtain superiority in the center by controlling d4 and f4 and prevent white from occupying d4
2) build a solid center and prevent white from playing ...e5
3) prepare quick development with moves like ...Be7 and Be6 and, at the same time, control d5
4) often black will be able to play ...d5 after which he will have a clear superiority in the center
If white is to prevent this he must generally occupy d5 with a N and after black exchanges on d5 and white retakes with the e-Pawn the result will be black has a superiority on the K-side. Finally, the move ...e5 considerably reduces white’s attacking prospects on the K-side which allows black better chances of carrying out his plans on the Q-side.
For black, the Q-side operations mean that the c-file is of great importance. Oddly, black’s play on the c-file is often of greater effect than white’s against the backward P on the d-file; that’ because black’s d-Pawn is well protected by the B on e7.
The short version is that playing ...e5 gives black active piece play that outweighs the weakness of the backward Pawn.
The following model game was played at the Gothenburg Interzonal in 1955. The top nine players qualified for the Amsterdam Candidates tournament in 1956. Samuel Reshevsky and Larry Evans qualified, but withdrew, opting to play in the US Open instead.
Of particular theoretical note was that the 14th round saw three unsuccessful tries of a novelty in the Sicilian by players from Argentina against their Soviet opponents.
The case of the brilliant Yugoslav player Andrija Fuderer was also significant. After 12 rounds Fuderer’s score was 7.5-3.5 with one bye. But in the remaining rounds he totally collapsed and scored only 1.5-7.5. He lost to Szabo, Donner, Keres, Geller, Bronstein, and Pachman, drawing with Petrosian, Spassky and Ilivitzky. After this tournament Fuderer left chess for a University career.
[Event "Gothenburg Interzonal"]
[Site "?"]
[Date "1955.8.16"]
[Round "?"]
[White "Wolfgang Unzicker"]
[Black "David Bronstein"]
[Result "0-1"]
[WhiteELO "?"]
[BlackELO "?"]
%Created by Caissa's Web PGN Editor
{B92: Sicilian Najdorf: 6 Be2} 1. e4 c5 2. Nf3 d6 3. d4 cxd4 4. Nxd4 Nf6 5.
Nc3 a6 6. Be2 {This game was played in round 2. Later, in round 14, the three
Soviet players caught their Argentine opponents in a prepared variation
beginning with 6.Bg5 and all won quickly.} 6... e5 7. Nb3 {More precise than
7...Be6 because after white castles he will play f4! with an active position.
By playing ...Be7 black retains the possibility of developing his B on b7 if
white plays f4.} 7... Be7 8. O-O O-O 9. Be3 {Now black has to decide how to
complete his development. The logical 9...Be6 is met by 10.f4 ut that would
give white good play. SO, with his next move black has the option of
developing his B on either e6 or b7 depending on what white does. Note that
9...b5 can be met by 10.a4! b4 11.Nd5.} 9... Qc7 10. a4 b6 11. Qd2 {Unzicker
is hoping Bronstein will follow the game Scherbakov-Simagin from a recent
oviet Championship in which black played 11... Bb7 and white got a good game.
In Gothenburg, against Averbakh, Simagin had an improvement prepared. Later,
at Stockholm 1962, in the game Geller-Fischer, black found further
improvements and managed to draw.} 11... Be6 {An original maneuver by
Bronstein deigned to get control of d5 plus give him pressure on the c-file.
Now 12. f4 is possible, but it's not so effective because after 12...Rc8 13.
g4 (Not 13. f5 Bc4) 13... exf4 14. Bxf4 Nxg4 15. Nd5! Qd7 (Black can't play
15... Bxd5?? 16. Qxd5 winning material) and white is much better.} 12. Rfd1
Rc8 13. Qe1 {Soltis recommended 13.Nc1 followed bt the maneuver Na2-b4 to
control d5, but he didn't give any supporting analysis. It seems that when
the N hits a2 black can prevent it from going to b4 with wither ... a5 or
...Nc6.} 13... Qb7 {Interesting! Soltis states black threatens ...Rxc3 and
... Nxe4 or ...d5. Pachman doesn't mention this possibility stating that
black will now secure control over d5 with the help of his Q and B. White can
only prevent the advance ...d5 by placing his B on f3 thereby giving up any
hope of active play.} 14. Rd2 {Now, in view of Soltis' comment that black's
last move threatened ...Rxc3, you'd think this move which does nothing to
prevent it would be bad. And, you're probably wondering why Bronstein didn't
play 14... Rxc3. Also, why did Soltis not make any comment about Bronstein's
next move? I found myself wondering the same thing. Soltis also made no
comment on why it would be bad for black to play 14...Nxe4.} 14... Nbd7 {Not
14...Nxe4 15.Nxe4 and black can't recapture because Bf3 would pin his Q and R.
What about 14...Rxc3. My sources (Stockfish and Komodo) indicate that after
the exchange sacrifice the chances would be about equal as white has about a
half-P advantage.} 15. f3 {White could prevent the advance ...d5 with 15.Rad1.
If he does then black's best chance would be to sacrifice the exchange. The
chances would then be about equal.} 15... d5 16. exd5 Nxd5 17. Nxd5 Bxd5 18.
Rad1 Nf6 {The threat is 19... Rxc2 and 20...Bxb3 winning a P. The upshot of
the trades have been that, theoretically at least, the position is equal.
But, clearly black has all the chances because white's pieces are lacking
mobility.} 19. Nc1 e4 20. Qf2 Bc5 21. Bxc5 bxc5 {Stockfish is still calling
this position equal, but Pachman observed that black has two spheres of
influence...the b-file and the K-side.} 22. Qe3 Re8 23. f4 {The passed d-Pawn
is blockaded, but using the Q to do it is not the most favorable piece to have
to use.} 23... c4 {He could not take the b-Pawn because 24.c4 attacks both the
Q and B. Now he does threaten the b-Pawn. Pachman says the threat is ...c3
and ...Rac8, but that's not the case.} 24. b3 {As Pachman points out, 24.c3
is bad. It leaves the a-Pawn weak and black can maneuver his N to d3.} 24...
Rac8 25. h3 {Neither Soltis nor Pachman commented on this move, but Unzicker
is playing very passively. He could have retained decent chances with the
aggressive 25.g4!} 25... Be6 26. Kh2 {Now 26.g4 has lost its punch because the
N can go to the aggressive post on d5. However, white could have tried 26.f5!
when the B must return to d5 so as to defend the c-Pawn.} 26... Qc7 27. Rd6
{By this point white has no active continuation.} 27... a5 { Engines, as they
do, point out a line where black can win the exchange, but white would have
two connected passed Ps (the a- and b-Ps) and in reality, nobody would want to
play that position.} 28. bxc4 Bxc4 29. Nb3 {Again, nobody has pointed out that
while black is better, Unzicker's position is by no means lost...that is until
after this move! He should have played 20.c3. Black would still be better
though. After the text with 29...Bd3! Bronstein would be attacking the R on
d6 and after 30.Rd4 Bxc2 black has a clearly winning position.} 29... Bxe2
30. Qxe2 e3 31. R6d4 Ne4 {Of course white can't take the P because of ...Nc3}
32. Qf3 Ng5 {He could have captured on c2 immediately, but the P isn't going
anywhere so he takes time to redeploy his N.} 33. Qg4 Ne6 34. Re4 {Is the
e-Pawn doomed?} 34... h5 35. Qf3 Ng5 {Even better was 35...Nxf4 and the N
can't be taken. If the R takes then 36...g5 and it's pinned against the K.
If the Q takes then after 36...Rxe4 the exchange of Qs is forced leaving black
an easy win. Bronstein was in time pressure here and that's why he missed
35.. .Nxf4.} 36. Rxe8+ Rxe8 37. Qg3 Qxc2 {Black's e-Pawn is going to decide
the issue.} 38. Rd5 e2 {Bronstein says that, with seconds left, he had no time
to calculate the consequences of this move, but played it based on instinct.}
39. Rxg5 e1=Q 40. Rxg7+ Kh8 41. Qg5 {Threatening mate of course, but Bronstein
has prepared a nice finish that decoys white's Q.} 41... Qxg2+ {Now 42.Kxg2
Re2 mates in two.} 42. Qxg2 Re2 0-1